While the Chinese liberalized their economy and created a brand new labor market scarcely fifteen years ago, they have relied on their pre-existing institutions, including governmentaffiliated trade unions, to provide a structure for labor-management relations. As industrial conflict has risen along with privatization and increasingly competitive markets, the Chinese government seems to have come to recognize the importance of transforming their old industrial relations system to adapt to these market changes. This transformation requires abandoning the "transmission-belt" model that dates back to the days of the planned economy, which primarily advanced the Communist Party's program, but at the same time most of the evidence suggests that worker-interest representation remains a joint function of the Party and institutions cooperating with it. Recent changes in both law and practice provide evidence of their serious interest in creating an industrial relations system, while attempting to avoid the risk of social and political destabilization, but direct social and institutional change in China requires careful testing to determine both the efficacy of new approaches and to see whether it endangers the social and political stability that the government wants.
small enterprises previously considered outside the boundaries for Chinese labor unions. We also discuss cases in other provinces in which local unions have taken the initiative to organize migrant workers in a way that foreshadows changes in the Chinese legal corpus that we think empowers unions to take hitherto unheard of if not impermissible actions on behalf of migrant and otherwise dispossessed workers. We give special attention to the extent to which contingent labor relationships have grown in importance in China and to the challenge these relationships present to unions responsible for maintaining harmonious workplace relationships. Certain changes in practice, including the new Labor Contract Law, may provide a vehicle with which to develop a Chinese industrial relations system better able to balance equity with efficiency and achieve the government's goal of "harmonious society" ( 谐 会 (Xinhua News Agency 2005). We find that incremental industrial relations reform continues to occur in many areas of China, particularly where product and labor markets have transformed relationships between workers -especially migrant peasant workers (nongmingong, or "farmers-turned-workers") newly integrating into the industrial and market economy -and employers.
This trend becomes particularly salient when considering the compensation packages offered to workers -especially nongmingong -who make up a large share of China's growing working class. While the problem exists throughout China, Guandong and other southern provinces are replete with private entrepreneurs who have taken advantage of the development of the market to hire migrant workers and others who work without the benefit of union representation and often without the benefit even of the individual labor contract required by law.
Here one finds some of the most exploited workers in China and one key locus for new union activity designed to put the brakes on these practices. The Labor Contract Law seems to be tailor-made to support many of the Chinese unions' new innovative organizing and representational activities.
Theoretical considerations
Many Chinese scholars and policy leaders believe industrial relations is China's most critical challenge, and their need to develop a research agenda in industrial relations is urgent.
Industrial relations problems lie at the heart of current high-profile issues such as the generally growing inequality produced by the rapid shift to market governance, and the growing reliance on labor markets in particular to regulate China's economic development. Unregulated markets tend to promote greater inequality as the consequences of liberalization, deregulation, and deinstitutionalization ripple out to labor markets (Belman and Belzer 1997) . Markets may overwhelm institutions (Belzer 2000) , and when the changing balance between markets and institutions destabilizes, markets may become the dominant institution governing social and economic relations until the imbalance provokes a socially and politically destabilizing backlash from workers (Taylor, Chang Kai, and Li Qi 2003) , a phenomenon that appears to concern the Chinese government. Inequality in China has now reached the level of that in the United States, which is far greater than that of most industrialized countries.
Starting with the three objectives of the employment relationship -efficiency, equity, and voice (Budd 2004 ) -we assess the effectiveness of existing and developing Chinese labor institutions. We test the extent to which the industrial relations system is performing effectively by looking at the distribution of employment outcomes such as wages, benefits, and working conditions. We look across several sectors in the Chinese economy as well as several forms and structures of ownership, since outcomes appear to vary across these dimensions much the same as they vary by industry, market, and firm size elsewhere in market-driven economies. We also look at specific experiments in industrial relations that currently are underway in China, and which constitute concrete efforts -inside or outside the confines of the current law -to attempt to close the equity gap. These innovations represent strategic choices on the part of relatively local unions to address these problems as they emerge in their areas. We interpret Chinese industrial relations using the three-tier model proposed by Kochan, Katz, and McKersie (Kochan and Katz 1988; Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1986; Kochan et al. 2008 ).
We have developed some skepticism, however, about whether the concept of voice as understood by the International Labor Organization (ILO) (Budd 2004) should have as much weight as equity and efficiency in assessing the balance essential for an effective east Asian labor-management relationship. The voice concept that westerners maintain is one steeped in the tradition of power conflicts and disputation (Nisbett 2003) , something for which the tradition in China is controversial and perhaps even weak. The 2,500-year-old philosophy of Daoism ( ; transliterated also as "Taoism"), for example, considers disputation to be a waste of energy that promotes disharmony, while Confucian tradition, of similar age and perhaps even more pervasive reach, promotes the kind of respect for authority that discourages disputes (Mair 1998 ).
Although we do not shrink from embracing the ILO's pluralist notion of voice, we simply are not sure whether we should consider it as important in China as the very measurable outcome of equity. On that score, China is not doing well and being tied with the United States for inequality is not an enviable situation (Central Intelligence Agency 2007b , 2007a ; the United
States leads the industrial world on that dimension.
In addition, we think the State plays a stronger role, in Asia in general and China in particular, than the prevailing industrial relations models provide. In an Asian corporatist state such as China, the State is not just an honest broker but also an active agent with a substantial property interest. The Chinese State continues to act as a major investor, even as privatization of government-owned firms, privately owned firms, and the market development process proceeds unabated. Industrial relations models that work in China must therefore account for the government's equity interest as well as its regulatory functions. Although the State does not have a direct investment in the small private firms that are the focus of this study, one could argue that given the competitive implications inherent in the new product and labor markets generated by the marketization process, the actions of these private-sector employers will have equity implications for state-owned and state-invested firms at many levels.
In addition, the lines that separate the government, the union, the company management, and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are blurred (Gallagher 2005) . Party officials may represent the interests of the government, the union, or management, and the union itself is part of the government. In this very strong corporatist state environment, the question for industrial relations may be less a question of formal voice mechanisms and more whether the workers generally are better off because of the influence of the Union and, by inference, the State. In sum, the Chinese State is not merely the mediator between business and labor interests, but it is an active stakeholder as well as a property-holder.
For these reasons and for this analysis, we propose to modify the well-known "three-tier model" to include three parties, rather than the usual two, within the box that incorporates the strategic, functional, and workplace loci of activity (Kochan et al. 2008 ). In the western liberal pluralist tradition, the State plays a relatively weak and outsider role as a regulator and primarily acts as an external environmental influence. The Union in China is a paradoxical institution; it plays a complex role as a major functional activity of the CCP as well as a governmental institution in a structure in which the State itself may have a property interest. In China, while the State operates in the industrial relations environment and plays an outsider role, it also acts as an active participant at all three levels and therefore must be included as an active participant.
Finally, we assess the value systems operating at the core of the Chinese industrial relations system. While Budd and others successfully introduce business ethics into industrial relations (Budd 2004; Bowie 2005; Wheeler 2005; Budd and Scoville 2005; Kaufman 2005) , the ethical systems generally are western (Scoville, Lawler, and Xiang Yi 2005 Western political theory, at least, would suggest that a lack of worker voice would contribute to growing economic inequality in a pluralist, competitive market environment, and that growing inequality will contribute to social and political instability. Others, notably Taylor, Chang and Li (2003; last chapter) , also point out that Chinese have revolted repeatedly and frequently throughout Chinese history against unrequited demands for equity (as implied by the 1 "Heaven sees with the eyes of its people. Heaven hears with the ears of its people." perspective of Mèngzǐ above), so it seems fair to hypothesize that a lack of equity and voice in China today will eventually lead to instability. We therefore propose to test the effectiveness of the Chinese industrial relations system against this theory.
The shift from institutions to markets
Much has been said about the decline of the state-owned firm (Warner 2004; Yi Zhang and Xi Li 2006) , but our research suggests that the state-owned firm is alive and well, and prospering greatly during the current and ongoing boom (Saxton 2005) 2 , even as its relative share of the economy has declined. It generally is true that industrial relations structures and strategies mirror the structure and strategy of any nation's firms, and this is especially important in China because the state has a property-holding stake in a substantial number of firms. While in western countries -especially in corporatist political economies -the state has a stake in industrial relations outcomes, the web of government ownership throughout the firm and its subsidiaries is so overwhelming in China that industrial relations models built on the assumption that government plays a mediating role between employers and employees (and their unions) will fail to capture the important effects of state action. This has been especially true insofar as the All The fundamental value governing the mixed-motive unionized relationship in China, the notion that the company and the union "have the same fate" and the union and the members have the "same heart", 3 becomes stretched to the breaking point when the firm is privately held and hires migrant workers under dubious circumstances, frequently not paying them at all for they work they perform for months at a time (2005) . Although the union represents the interests of the workers, in China it also must incorporate the interests of the firm as well. In firms that abuse or fail to pay their workers, however, or that fail to sign legal employment contracts with them, the union and the company cannot be of the same heart. These kinds of firms are the target of this new labor contract law and some of the innovations in labor relations in China designed to take concrete steps to use the unions to gain greater equity for workers.
While China's "market economy with socialist character" has resulted in China's current status as a "global factory" (2002), China's success has caught the attention of the world. Not only has China become a national "factory" that produces labor-intensive products, but it also has gradually entered quality production markets that rely on intensive skills and capital in the production process. Along with the development of the market economy, steady growth also has created an estimated 200 million consumers 4 . For almost two decades, China's economic growth rate has averaged 9.8% annually (see Table 1 (Morrison 2006) The rapid pace of economic, institutional, and technological change has its own destabilizing dynamic and may constitute its own threat. Labor disputes are increasing in frequency and intensity, and the existing labor dispute resolution mechanism, arbitration, cannot keep up with this growing unrest ( Table 2) . •
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Annual Report (2003) The causes of labor disputes, however, are not terribly mysterious. In China, as in developed countries, most labor disputes revolve around wages and benefits, labor protection, and change or termination of the labor contract (discharges and other post-hoc alterations).
These are rather ordinary but salient issues in a country in which inequality has increased dramatically as the middle and wealthy urban classes have benefited from development, while workers and peasants have fallen behind (Table 3) . 
Finally, the industrial relations dispute resolution mechanism on which China has relied with some success in past years appears to be failing. A system created more than fifteen years ago as China was just beginning to develop a labor market as well as a focus on the foreign direct investment that would propel its growth (Gallagher 2002) , labor arbitration was a kind of planning approach to market development and reflected an internal struggle within the Communist Party over the balance between market reforms and central planning (Johnston 2002 ).
As Table 4 shows, disputes subjected to the existing mediation and arbitration systems have increased, but the system has become less, rather than more efficient. A rapidly growing number of disputes fail mediation and go to arbitration, burdening the system. While workers win a majority of these formal disputes, those who fail increasingly turn to the courts. The burden on both systems has increased while a system of efficient industrial dispute resolution has been elusive (Gallagher and Dong BaoHua 2008) . Because almost all enterprises had been owned by the workers' state, and since the government considers it inappropriate and illegal for workers to organize unions for representation independent of the Communist Party that leads the workers' state, China only recently has had a reason to create collective bargaining institutions. As the initial post-Mao reforms began, the Party leadership initially broke in into two factions, one pro-market and one pro-planning. While the original free-market group collapsed with the decline of Hu Yaobang in 1987 (particularly when Deng Xiaoping apparently switched sides, alarmed at the unrest stimulated by the process), the planners also failed to manage growth with state planning and by 1992-1993, the contest to set Chinese economic policy shifted back to "state marketeers," who wanted to use competition but keep most of the ownership in the hands of the State, and "pragmatic planners", who tended to retain more confidence in planning than in markets (Johnston 2002 ). 
Ministry of Labor and Social Security [MOLSS]
6 ) was more closely tied to the planners, and tended to prefer centralized institutions like arbitration to decentralized institutions like unions might be. For these and other reasons, the 1994 Labor Law was aimed at regulating labor relations in market-driven but state-owned businesses (Gallagher and Dong BaoHua 2008) .While the All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) was part of this coalition, it seems to us that the MOL had the stronger hand because the institutions they established favored the labor arbitration process that they led. The two factions, however, were growing closer together.
In the late 1990s, a strong effort by the statist free-marketers to regain power over the planners ultimately led to a conversion of forces and a conversion of perspectives. As China's growth picked up steam and market pressure became more pervasive, the need to restructure state-owned firms became salient. Market forces now were becoming fully engaged and the growth in the privately owned sector began to put sufficient pressure on state-owned firms that they were forced to restructure. This restructuring, combined with the growing private sector for which neither the law creating workers' congresses for the state-owned sector (Standing The social contract between management, the government, and labor has become less stable, and new relationships must be created.
New Institutions to Deal with Markets?
Concern has been growing that the existing body of law has not been adequate to balance efficiency and equity in the industrial relations system. Inequality is growing in China and the growth of the market model has outstripped the ability of the existing institutions to enforce current law and maintain the balance necessary for a "harmonious society." Before the 2007 passage of the Labor Contract Law (Barboza 2006; Jiang Junlu 2007) , many companies had exploited a loophole in the labor law provisions for individual contracts that allowed them to hire workers as individual contractors with or without any employment relationship to them. Under this construct, employers have begun using recruiting or "dispatching" firms that act as labor contractors, "selling" these workers to employers who sign individual commercial contracts rather than labor contracts; these workers, called "dispatching workers," have neither an employment relationship with the firm that dispatched them nor an employment relationship with the firm that employed their labor. The use of dispatched workers has increased substantially in recent years; indeed, in one major city, the use of dispatching workers rose from 20% to 40% in just the years from 2002-2004. 7 The Labor Contract Law that passed the National Peoples Congress Collective contracts are rather legalistic, in that they codify the national labor law within the contract in much the same way as clauses that introduce U.S. collective bargaining contracts state that nothing in the contract should be construed as violating U.S. labor and employment law, and that any such clauses shall be considered null and void. They also are collective contracts only insofar as they collect the terms and conditions of individual worker contracts and place The growth of market relations over the last dozen years has exposed weaknesses in this law and the need for substantial modifications, as many new forms of employment -such as dispatching workers with an unclear relationship to existing institutions -had become common throughout the country. The Labor Contract Law supercedes the old individual contract provisions in the Labor Law, although it does so by strengthening, rather than weakening, reliance on individual contracts, while adding a limited responsibility for collective contract negotiation to the ACFTU's portfolio. While it does not seem that the government is ready yet to cut the union loose to enforce Labor Law directly, by giving the union the responsibility of getting individual contracts on paper (something that the Labor Law already requires but which often does not happen, particularly in southern China), employees and employers will have to set out terms and conditions of employment -rights and obligations -that comply with the law and can be enforced by the arbitration and court systems much more readily. The ultimate purpose of this change in the legal framework may be to put the brakes on the race to the bottom resulting from liberalized employment arrangements. The CCP may have concluded that the growing anarchy in labor markets has given too much power to employers and the government needs to engage the ACFTU in this effort to stop the growing inequality of outcomes. Indeed, one section regulates dispatched workers specifically.
The current resolution of this debate is the result of an internal debate within the ACFTU. 
Experiments and Innovations in Union Activity
Chinese labor unions have been attempting to deal with growing problem of inequality and inequity that the market economy has produced. It may be fair to hypothesize that they really did not know what to expect when they shifted from planning to markets, but the steady drumbeat of support for markets coming from western economists and western-trained Chinese economists certainly did not prepare them for what they experienced. The stories from the west mostly have been glowing accounts of how markets work to make everyone prosperous. While markets have been successful in the west and while globalization may have produced higher average wealth, the failure to distinguish between overall wealth and the distribution of that wealth has not prepared the Chinese for the exploding inequality they experienced.
The earliest example of a migrant peasants union seems to be in Nanjing (Jingsu Province) in 2000. This approach developed because the local union leadership recognized that migrant peasant workers were not joining the enterprise unions because they had done at their home address (Chinese consider their home towns to be the place where they or their family, and their ancestors, originated). They began to organize them into "community unions" and by June 2000 they had spread the concept throughout the Nanjing area. Wuhan (Hubei Province) also recognized this problem and followed quickly in Nanjing's footsteps. Shenyang followed by representatives, which was a major policy shift that gave the unions the right to represent, the right to advocate on behalf of workers, and the right to sue on their behalf if necessary. Another important feature of the Hubei Model was that it prohibited bosses and their family from serving as union officials, it shifted fee collection responsibility from the union to the tax bureau, and it provided security from discharge to union presidents (XinYiyang 2003).
Another key innovation, or experiment, is the development of "community unions." These are union-type associations that unions establish at the street or block level within city districts. 2007; 2007) , the union in Changchun set out to hire union presidents and get them out on the street to establish unions across a range of small private enterprisese, mostly in the restaurant industry, and employing migrant peasant workers.
An Experiment to Professionalize Union Presidents in Changchun
Some degree of uniformity to labor standards has begun to emerge, beginning to change the facts on the ground. Although wages have improved improvements seems to be quite uneven.
Brakes have been placed on overtime work at the discretion of employers, more guarantees have backed up the system of employee leave and break time, social insurance and pension contributions by the employer have been enhanced, and workers have seen some improvement in working conditions and fringe benefits. 11 While none of this is meant to claim that China's industrial relations problems -much less its problems with freedom of speech and associationhave been solved, they do represent concrete steps toward the development of a functioning industrial relations system appropriate for a market economy.
It also is important to understand that the Chinese make changes one small step at a time.
Rather than begin by passing a law and then determining whether the law achieved the intended result, as we do ideally in the west, the Chinese tend to experiment with practices that address perceived problems and use these experiments to test the practices that they later formalize in the law. This use of experiments is particularly important for the development of labor law in particular and industrial relations generally in China (Gallagher 2005 ). As suggested above, this is consistent with an inductive approach to the world that is very different than the deductive one that westerners use (Nisbett 2003 ).
In The union structure in Changchun also plays an important role. While the ACFTU and employees of member unions are government employees, the hierarchy to which they report is somewhat different from that of the rest of the government, creating a parallel chain-ofcommand that may represent a countervailing power structure (Taylor, Chang Kai, and Li Qi 2003) . At the province level, the union hierarchy extends down to the Basic Local Union for firms employing 25 or more workers and the United Local Union for firms employing fewer than 25 workers.
Figure 1. Structure of Jilin and Chaoyang Unions
According to the 2001 Amendment to the Trade Union Law, originally passed in 1992, the following options are available to the union. First, higher level union can establish a local union commission; second, two or more firms can be united to establish a local union commission; and third, one "organizer" can be elected from among the employees to organize the workers to Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People's Congress 2004) . The law has no specific guidance regarding whether the union can hire professionals as presidents.
The Changchun City union hired six persons as union president candidates from among 150 people who applied as the result of a local news story. Once hired, their job was to organize enterprises and workers in a sector of firms employing fewer than 25 workers. Their employment was provisional for two months after which they would be evaluated by the district level union, followed by an election procedure held by the Workers' Congress in that District.
The six selected union presidents were responsible for all the union organizing and worker 
What is new about this model and what problem was it created to resolve?
Union presidents had never before been hired and paid by the union outside the control of the firm. In the traditional system, union presidents develop inside the enterprise and are paid as . In these cases, presidents frequently are appointed by the boss or only take the union job as a part-time one in private enterprises. Because they are employed by the boss and to a substantial extent depend on the boss to make a living, it is very difficult for them to protect the workers' rights in the private enterprises. Moreover, it is very difficult to organize the workers into unions in the large number of small private enterprises that are increasing very rapidly with the development of privately owned enterprises. The union created this new model, which is somewhat similar to a western union hiring organizers, to try to solve these problems; these organizers, however, become like professional business agents in a western sense and are responsible for administering the labor-management relationship after they have completed their organizing task but do so subject to election by their constituents. The union confederation that unites all the private enterprises in a certain block is created by the upper level union organization, and the president of it is recruited publicly and selected strictly based on the judgment of the union that the president is competent and independent from any private enterprise.
What political arrangements govern the system?
The Communist Party and the government support this new initiative because the ACFTU is led by the Party. In order to execute the new model properly and get the support of the Party, union organizing is combined with the construction of the local Party Committee in the private enterprises. Obviously this allows the CCP, which has become increasingly separated from the workers and the all-important danwei (Frazier 2002) , to reconstruct its relationship with regular people as they move from the state-owned enterprises to privately owned ones. Benefits are paid by the District-level ACFTU. The Street organization provides an office and bears the usual work expenses. Pay increases are regular but compensation is quite low.
These Community Union presidents are evaluated according to the administrative measures made by the provincial union. Presidents who implement their tasks and meet their organizing and representational targets, while serving both the needs of the workers and the development needs of the enterprises, receive public recognition and bonus compensation. Presidents who do not perform well and achieve less than a 60% satisfaction rate from the union members 13 will be dismissed.
The management of the system is under the direction of the Provincial and City Union, is implemented and organized by the District-level Union, and is administered directly by the A big outstanding problem for all of the unions in China has been the fact that despite the fact that they are entitled to two percent of all compensation -remember that they perform both a representational and human resource function for the firm -they have been chronically underfunded for many years (Gallagher 2005) . One reason why the Jilin union can afford to undertake this massive organizing and representation effort is that the province has agreed to assign responsibility for collection to the Tax Bureau. Even when there is no a local union, the Tax Bureau will collect two percent of total pay as a union fee. This money is used as a development fund for organizing unions when the Unions are in their organizing phase and used for administration once they have been organized.
How have these unions responded to organizing challenges?
Some of the private enterprises do not welcome these Presidents' union organizing activities.
A South Korean owner of one foreign-invested restaurant objected to it and said, "I don't want to make myself that kind of trouble. When I once traveled to Europe, I met worker's strike. It's terrible." In these cases, the union must convince the company that the union will benefit the enterprise as well as the workers. Unlike western unions, Chinese unions are responsible for both protecting workers and developing enterprises and need to develop consent of both labor and management. Employees in the small private enterprises are usually young nongmingong, who do not understand what unions will do for them and only care about earning money if conditions allow. They are reluctant to participate in unions or do not want the Presidents to approach them.
How do these Presidents organize their work?
First, the Presidents in Chaoyang District are independent and professional, and not constrained by the old-style bureaucracy of the ACFTU. Many of them are middle-aged workers from state-owned enterprises that have downsized and they do not belong to the traditional hierarchy of ACFTU. They do not just stay in the office like most of the ACFTU cadres but rather spend their time on the street, traveling from workplace to workplace on foot or by bicycle.
Their "office", therefore, is "flowing". They move around to visit the private enterprises and go to talk with and help the workers. Every worker employed in private enterprises in Chaoyang District who holds a Worker Protection Green Card (union member card) can go to the President for help.
At the same time the Presidents work to protect workers' rights, they serve the interests of the enterprises too. For example, one President of Qinghe Street Union Confederation in Chaoyang District made his own rule about how to serve the enterprises when at the same time protecting the workers; he called it the "Five Presences" ( 场).
1. The President has to be present when workers and their bosses have conflicts.
2. The President must be present when issues of non-payment occur.
3. The President must be there when workers get very sick.
4. The President must be present when workers face difficult-to-resolve problems.
5. The President must be on the scene when accidents happen in the enterprises and to take action to avoid occupational safety problems.
The Presidents also have helped resolve human resource shortage problems. In January of
2006, union Presidents helped the enterprises to solve the labor shortage problem as Spring
Festival approached -a common problem in China's migrant economy. After Presidents discovered the shortage problem, they reported it to the Chaoyang District. They then united three town-level unions to recruit young nongmingong from the countryside. Nongmingong also trusted them more because as representatives of the Chaoyang District Union, workers could assure themselves that the recruiters were actually there to help them get legitimate jobs and not to trick them to take employment that might lead to an undesirable job or even slavery (French 2007; Ni Ching-Ching 2007) . More than 170 nongmingong met with the employers, and mutual selection was done on the spot. Presidents extracted a quid pro quo, however, as they also signed contracts with these enterprises to get them to promise not to let non-payment problems happen. This way they also protected the rights of workers and these nongmingong became union members. After this event, a network was set up to get to know the employment needs of the enterprises and keep contacts with the labor market in case shortages develop again.
How do these union Presidents organize?
The union Presidents' style is as important as we would consider union organizers' style in the west. Presidents persuade the workers by telling them what they will get by participating in the union, and at the same time persuade the owners by telling them the benefits they get by supporting the union's establishment in their enterprise. Although union organization does not necessarily need the employers' agreement according to the Union Law, peaceful ways are preferred since harmonious society is the goal.
The first preference of these Presidents is to persuade the owners of the enterprises using soft ways to allow the unions to become organized. For example, when meeting very strong resistance from an enterprise, a few Presidents joined together to invite the owner to drink tea together, persuading the owner with collective power (a tea house is an important meeting space in China and served the same purpose in Taiwan In sum, what did union organizing achieve in Chaoyang District?
The union tackled the problems of workers protection in the private enterprises. The union identified itself as the institution that can really protect workers; it addressed workers' fear of losing jobs if conflict arises with the boss; but it still is not capable of protecting workers if their human capital characteristics are insufficient.
Between August represented and filed lawsuits pro bono on behalf of workers who either could not afford lawyers or did not know how to file legal claims, recovering an additional ¥250,000 in lawsuits acting as the workers' agent. 14 This is ¥500,000 translates to US$71,271, which is a great deal of money for workers making ¥500-600, or US$70-85 per month). He was able to do so because of his independence from the enterprises and also because of his knowledge of how to use the law to protect workers. In another example, President Liu, in charge of Chongqing Street Union Confederation in Chaoyang District, once found three firms that were paying workers under the lawful lowest wage. 15 President Liu negotiated with the bosses and got workers' wages up to the minimum wage. He also took initiative to select 20 workers as the negotiating representatives to help him with the negotiations about all kinds of issues. In 2007, the union investigated compliance with the law requiring employers to sign labor contracts and found that the labor contract signing rate and pension security participation rate was 12% and 10% respectively in this district. These rates have risen to 60% and 30%, respectively, as a result of having professionalized the union presidents 16 . The Community Union generally has been able to increase the welfare of many of the lowest-paid and most disadvantaged workers, such as obtaining workers' compensation payments for injuries at work as well as improved food and lodging.
The Community Union has lowered the turnover rate of workers. Yuenan Restaurant, which originally was located in Qinghe Street but which now is relocated in Nanzhan Street the same Chaoyang District, provides a good example. The Union there helped to build cooperative labor relations, lowering the turnover rate from 30% (which is very usual in restaurant industry) to 10%. Since the beginning of 2007, in the level of small private enterprises, union confederation tripartite consultation systems and procedures have been set up and improved step by step, standardizing the preparation process for starting the Workers' Congress and the equal consultation procedure that develops the terms and conditions to include in collective contracts.
In addition, the unions standardized the equal mediation process and the content of the mediation before signing the collective contracts. The rate of both building systems and signing collective contracts has reached 100%. style of merit appraisals in the company, and create a suggestion system adapted to small private enterprises, as appropriate, in an effort to introduce democratic management. The union hopes that will give workers some faith in democratic management. The union intends that this activity protect the workers' democratic political rights, and workers can protect their own benefits through participating widely in management. The union also intends that this activity arouse workers' initiative and enthusiasm in participating in management, seeking to achieve development together with employers. Some of the unions in the sixteen-union confederation of non-public companies in Chaoyang District held a Workers Congress in September of 2007 and signed collective contracts at the level of the union confederation. The Workers Congress activity will be promoted in the companies that have more than 25 workers, aiming at enlarging the coverage of democratic management in non-public companies, and attempting to make all these companies have democratic management by the end of 2008. During the conclusion of the Employees' Representative Congress, a regular system for checking up on the status of democratic management in these firms began. At the request of the Workers Congress, worker representatives were designated and authorized to supervise and check regularly to ensure that the suggestions and comments issued by the Workers' Congress and from the worker representatives have been dealt with seriously and implemented properly, and if they find problems they will report them to the upper level union.
With all this success, the Community Union still faces some challenges. The qualities of the people -dedication, enthusiasm, integrity, and commitment to improving the working and living conditions of migrant peasant workers -is a crucial variable. Great people can use these institutions to achieve success, while less inspired people who do not put forward the effort tend to be less successful. Controlling for these individual factors, however, the professional presidents in all districts appear to be performing better than did some of the traditional union people in their hierarchies
17
. The enthusiasm and capabilities of the Chaoyang district staff have been critical factor making this model successful. The biggest challenge they now face is trying to organize collective negotiations among these small firms, which would be the basis for collective contracts. Salaries remain low, particularly in view of their responsibilities and workload.
Conclusion
Chinese industrial relations is important to US workers employed by industries that compete difficult. An initiative not permitted by the Trade Union Law, they have recruited outsidersmost of them retired public servants and even retired private firms managers -as organizers and hired the "community union" president 20 on a temporary basis; the hired union president must stand for election in two months if he is to remain in office. They argue that although the Trade Union Law requires that union leadership be elected from among the membership, employees of these small firms cannot deal with the employers directly and hence cannot organize themselves on their own. For this reason, the district union has begun organizing employees in these small companies, facilitating the union's daily business by providing them with a union president who is paid by the provincial union, the Provincial Medium-Small Enterprises Bureau (a government institution in charge of development of medium-small private enterprises) and the District-level government. In this case, the union claims that it is helping the community-based union achieve its voice on labor relations issues.
Whether the Workers' Congress can perform its function actually depends on the capacity of the trade union at different firms. Clearly at top-tier firms, the workers' congress can perform its function because the institutional legacy maintains the influence of the Party workers' voice.
At lower-tier firms, while the workers congress structure may still exist, the function is dwindling. This trend demonstrates the challenge that worker interest representation faces as China's market revolution continues. 
